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Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2001

Noncooperative games in which each player’s payo¤ function depends on anadditively separable function of every player’s choice variable may be transformedinto an aggregative game, which may be analysed using the conceptof ‘share functions’. The resulting approach avoids the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868958

ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH GENERALTECHNOLOGIES

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; …

existence, uniqueness and rentdissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a productionfunction with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868959

RENTSEEKING BY PLAYERS WITH CONSTANTABSOLUTE RISK AVERSION

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2000

The rent-seeking model of Tullock (1980) has stimulated a large literature on rent-seekingcontests, of which Hillman (1989) and Nitzan (1994) provide useful surveys. AlthoughTullock's 'winner take all' model has been adapted and extended in numerous ways, thereremain fundamental modeling issues,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869062

DISSIPATION IN RENT-SEEKING CONTESTS WITHENTRY COSTS

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2002

This paper considers the extent to which expenditure by contestants inimperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contests dissipates all or only partof the rent. In particular, we investigate strategic effects, technologicaleffects and asymmetry under an assumption of diminishing returns to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868938

FINANCIAL PREDATION BY THE WEAK

Bougheas, Spiros; Saksit Thananittayaudom - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We examine a Stackelberg game where a financially constrainedleader faces competition from a ‘deep pocket’ follower. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868761

BERTRAND AND COURNOT COMPETITIONS IN ADYNAMIC GAME

Mukherjee, Arijit - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2003

-tournament R&D competition. We consider thatsuccess in R&D is uncertain. We show that whether firms invest more under … Cournotcompetition or Bertrand competition is ambiguous and depends on the probability ofsuccess in R&D but does not depend on the degree … of product differentiation. While‘static’ welfare is higher under Bertrand competition, we find that ‘dynamic’ welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868906

WELFARE EFFECTS OF ENTRY: THE IMPACT OFLICENSING

Mukherjee, Arijit; Mukherjee, Soma - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2003

competition policy... …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868907

LOSS AVERSION AND THE TULLOCK PARADOX

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2003

We show that the presence of loss aversion on the part of participantsin a Tullock imperfectly discriminating contest … will significantlyreduce the proportion of the rent dissipated in the form of resourcesused up in the competition for that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868814

WEAK LINKS, GOOD SHOTS AND OTHER PUBLICGOOD GAMES: BUILDING ON BBV

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2006

We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-Blume-Varian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public goodthat avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is in-creased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868656

THE GEOMETRY OF AGGREGATIVE GAMES

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We study aggregative games in which players’ strategy sets areconvex intervals of the real line and (not necessarily differentiable)payoffs depend only on a player’s own strategy and the sum of allplayers’ strategies. We give sufficient conditions on each player’s payofffunction to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868768