The fact that according to the celebrated Coase Theorem rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold-up...

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...

This paper explores the impact of insatiable needs on the sustainability and the direction of technological change and economic growth. In a simple framework it is shown that growth can only be sustained if either the opportunity costs of research are small at low levels of research or if some...

We study a model of local evolution. Players are located on a network and play games agains their neighbors. Players are characterized by three properties: (1) The stage game strategies they use agains their neighbors. (2) The repeated game strategy that determines the former. (3) A learning...

This paper applies the idea of evolution to a spatial model. We assume that prisoners' dilemmas or coordination games are played repeatedly within neighborhoods where players do not optimize but instead copy successful strategies. Discriminatory behavior of players is introduced representing...

We present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are permanently matched. These players learn from the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by...

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2) negative welfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment. In a two-player game reciprocation is economically...

In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.

We develop an evolutionary model of growth in which agents choose how to allocate their time between private and social activities. We argue that a shift from social to private activities may foster market-based growth, but also generate social poverty. Within a formal framework that merges a...

While various liability rules of tort law provide efficient incentives to invest, breach remedies of contract law are claimed to be distortive. Since, at least in Germany, obligations law provides general rules for both contractual and tort relationships such discrepancy seems puzzling. The...