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Overbidding in Fixed Rate Tenders - An Empirical Assessment of Alternative Explanations

Nautz, Dieter; Oechssler, Jörg - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003

This paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European … explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate … expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968425

Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets

Neugebauer, Tibor; Selten, Reinhard - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002

feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently reported. Our … data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968447

Dominance or Maximin: How to Solve an English Auction

Kamecke, Ulrich - University of Bonn, Germany - 1993

It is widely believed that the English auction is solved after the dominated strategies are eliminated. This opinion is formally confirmed only for one "ascending clock" auction and can not be generalized for most other English auctions. In this paper I show that the formal argument which is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968187

A Learning Approach to Auctions

Monderer, Dov; Hon-Snir, Shlomit; Sela, Aner - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968224

Zuschlag erhalten, aber Verlust gebucht - Gefdhrdet der Fluch des Gewinners auch Kapitalmarktprofis?

Hehn, Elisabeth; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

Zwei Experimente mit Entscheidungstrdgern aus der Praxis des Finanzmarkts sind durchgefuehrt worden, um die Frage zu klaeren, ob es Umstände gibt, unter denen der Fluch des Gewinners auch Kapitalmarktprofis gefdhrdet. Die Antwort ist ein klares "Ja". Der Fluch des Gewinners schlug nicht nur im...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968226

The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder's Value is Commonly Known

Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

We consider 2-bidder first-price auctions where one bidder's value is commonly known. Such auctions induce an ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser, increases (reduces) the ineffciency of the market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968329

Efficient partnership dissolution under buy/sell clauses

Frutos, Maria Angeles de; Kittsteiner, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

When a partnership comes to an end partners have to determine the terms of the dissolution. A well known way to do so is by enforcing a buy/sell option. Under its rules one partner has to offer a price for the partnership and the other agent can choose whether she wants to sell her share or buy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968343

Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale

Garrat, Rod; Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968344

When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps

Feess, Eberhard; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Walzl, Markus - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002

overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968347

Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information

Tröger, Thomas; Mylovanov, Tymofiy - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008

We consider the problem of mechanism design by a principal who has private information. We point out a simple condition under which the privacy of the principal's information is irrelevant in the sense that the mechanism implemented by the principal coincides with the mechanism that would be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968418