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Overbidding in Fixed Rate Tenders - An Empirical Assessment of Alternative Explanations

Nautz, Dieter; Oechssler, Jörg - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003

This paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European … explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate … expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968425

Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets

Neugebauer, Tibor; Selten, Reinhard - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002

feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently reported. Our … data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968447

Panel Data Models with Unobserved Multiple Time - Varying Effects to Estimate Risk Premium of Corporate Bonds

Bada, Oualid; Kneip, Alois - University of Bonn, Germany - 2010

risk premia in the bond market. In order to estimate the dimensionality of the hidden risk factors jointly with the model … confirms the presence of four common risk components affecting the U.S. corporate bonds during the period between September … 2006 and March 2008. However, one single risk factor is sufficient to describe the data for all time periods prior to mid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671393

Signaling in First-Price Auctions

Rieck, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2010

It is commonly assumed in private value auctions that bidders have no information about the realization of the other bidders' valuations. Nevertheless, an informative public signal about the realization may be released by a bidder while he learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008676565

Risk and Expected Utility Theory

Rieck, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2009

In multi-attribute procurement auctions with multiple objects, the auctioneer may care about the interplay of quality attributes that do not belong to the same item – like each item’s delivery time, if all items are needed at once. This can in?uence the performance of the auction mechanism....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735013

Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments Revisited

Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011

The paper addresses the problem of optimally matching heterogeneous players in a two-stage two-type Lazear-Rosen tournament in which the semifinal losers are eliminated. The organizer of the tournament can either choose two homogeneous semifinals -- one between two strong players and the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651599

Invader Strategies in the War of Attrition with Private Information

Metzger, Lars Peter - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011

Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some valuations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009189377

Dominance or Maximin: How to Solve an English Auction

Kamecke, Ulrich - University of Bonn, Germany - 1993

It is widely believed that the English auction is solved after the dominated strategies are eliminated. This opinion is formally confirmed only for one "ascending clock" auction and can not be generalized for most other English auctions. In this paper I show that the formal argument which is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968187

A Learning Approach to Auctions

Monderer, Dov; Hon-Snir, Shlomit; Sela, Aner - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968224

Zuschlag erhalten, aber Verlust gebucht - Gefdhrdet der Fluch des Gewinners auch Kapitalmarktprofis?

Hehn, Elisabeth; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

Zwei Experimente mit Entscheidungstrdgern aus der Praxis des Finanzmarkts sind durchgefuehrt worden, um die Frage zu klaeren, ob es Umstände gibt, unter denen der Fluch des Gewinners auch Kapitalmarktprofis gefdhrdet. Die Antwort ist ein klares "Ja". Der Fluch des Gewinners schlug nicht nur im...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968226