We propose a simple mechanism that might improve voluntary contributions to public goods. Using a laboratory experiment we analyze how bundling public with private goods affects individuals' valuations for both goods. In the experiment, subjects may purchase a private and a public good either...

We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...

The Benefit and Cost of Winner Picking: Redistribution Vs Incentives |AB| A multi-divisional firm can engage in "winner-picking" to redistribute scarce funds efficiently across divisions. But there is a conflict between rewarding winners (investing) and producing resources internally to reward...

We analyze innovation race in a moral hazard setting. We develop a model in which two competing entrepreneurs work independently on the same project. The entrepreneurs do not possess any wealth of their own and their research is financed by a venture capitalist. The project, if successful,...

Let S=(S_t), t=0,1,...,T (T being finite), be an adapted R^d-valued process. Each component process of S might be interpreted as the price process of a certain security. A trading strategy H=(H_t), t= 1,...,T, is a predictable R^d-valued process. A strategy H is called extreme if it represents a...

Pricing and hedging of long-term interest rate sensitive products require to extrapolate the term structure beyond observable maturities. For the resulting limiting term structure we show two results by postulating no arbitrage in a bond market with infinitely increasing maturities: long...

Within the structural approach for credit risk models we discuss the optimal exercise of the callable and convertible bonds. The Vasi˘cek–model is applied to incorporate interest rate risk into the firm’s value process which follows a geometric Brownian motion. Finally, we derive pricing...