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This paper discusses the properties of stylized U.S. ("U-type") and Japanese tournaments ("J-type"), which can both solve the unverifiability problem of labor contracts. Under a zero-profit condition, both tournament types will yield first-best efforts if workers are homogenous and risk neutral....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968364
In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968410
-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989614
. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the … notion of \emph{procedural stability}. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535252
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028406
all players. Further, the question of stability of such a distribution is studied. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989621
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004993101
In this Paper we propose a concept of stability for intertemporal equilibria with rational expectations: current period … Hicks' and exceptional stability. In an intertemporal variant of Scarf's example on the instability of Walrasian t …×tonnement process it will be seen that the stability notion we propose is more stable than any other process investigated so far. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968170