the case where monetary transfers are not possible, but a different, implicit kind of collusion arises because the … contract could be enforced. We show that the difference in the cause of collusion leads to a difference in the way in which … collusion is prevented: the agent's incentive scheme is used to give incentives to the supervisor. An interdependence between …

used as a divide-and-rule strategy by the principal to create additional incentives when collusion among the agents is …

The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by … constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the …

This paper investigates a procurement relationship between a welfare-oriented government and a private supplier. The … procurement where the buyer maximizes profit rather than welfare. We identify the government's welfare objective as its Achilles …' heel: equilibrium trade prices differ in public and private procurement, and private governance can lead to more efficient …

In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper … we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a … post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement …