In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...

Adaptive learning and punishment are highly prominent competing explanations for ultimatum game behavior. We report on an experiment that considers each theory in stand-alone form, so that one does not rely on the other in any substantial way. Our data exhibits patterns for which punishment can...

Two players bargain over the allocation of a sum of money. They are only incompletely informed about the opponent's alternative in case of conflict. The paper investigates two different experimental approaches: the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment and the strategies...

Video taped group decision experiments on a two-person investment game were used to elicit the motivational structure of subjects' behavior. A majority of investors trusted (invested) and a majority of receivers reciprocated (returned). Cognition and decision were focused on extremes: total or...

We report an experiment that uses the strategy method (Selten 1967) to elicit subjects' general strategy for playing any 2-person 3x3-game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99. Each two subjects' strategies play 500000 games in each of the 5 tournaments. For games with pure strategy equilibria...

We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that...

We consider the situation where the owner of some good wants to sell the good to one of several potential buyers. We assume that the owner possesses private information about the buyers' valuations of the good, and analyze this model as an informed principal mechanism design model. In an...