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How Payment Systems Affect Physicians' Provision Behaviour – An Experimental Investigation

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Selten, Reinhard; Wiesen, Daniel - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011

research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse the influence of incentives from fee-for-service and …Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central concern in health economics … capitation payments on physicians’ supply of medical services. In our experiment, physicians choose quantities of medical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008913273

On Organizational Decision Rules and Innovative Activity

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

for optimal rules in several contexts. A trade-off arises between the use of information and the incentives created by a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968135

Do New Brooms Sweep Clean? - Why and when Dismissing Managers Increases a Firm's Performance

Hvffler, Felix; Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

If a manager stays in office for a long time he will have learned much about his subordinates. Thus competition among them will be weakened as the manager has made up his mind who is suited best for which position. With a new manager the ``rat race'' for favorable tasks is restarted leading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968159

The Design of Incentives in the Presence of Lobbying Activity

Wessels, Joachim H. - University of Bonn, Germany - 1995

-powered incentives in the optimal contract. Secondly, complementing Itoh's findings, we conclude that even if there are no productive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968161

On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

We examine the question whether a decision should be delegated to a subordinate and whether this is done efficiently. We illustrate that delegation is useful for several reasons. First, it serves to test agents with unknown ability. Then, it may improve their motivation when carrying out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968181

On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001

It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968331

Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability

Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted. Therefore, this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968360

When Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal

Lehmann, Stefanie Aniela - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008

incentives and accordingly is not in the principal’s interest. In this paper I compare two different designs of a collective …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968387

On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003

By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent … convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968398

Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? -- On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts

Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 2006

We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968412