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Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs
Stremitzer, Alexander - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008
We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of … defendant. Moreover, if litigation is a public good as is the case in shareholder derivative suits, parties may fail to reach a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989625
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Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation
Gürtler, Oliver; Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2007
exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover …, when the litigation can be settled by the parties the pure threat of using the legal system may suffice to make the …- uations where the agent is protected by limited liability, where the parties have different technologies in the litigation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968338
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Contests Among Bureaucrats
Bös, Dieter - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002
This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968363
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Aggressiveness and Redistribution
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003
In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989601
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Anarchy, Efficiency and Redistribution
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - University of Bonn, Germany - 2000
The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first develop a contractarian theory of redistribution. The existence of rules … in trade. The second purpose of the paper is to develop a theory of institutions that implement optimal allocations. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989639
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Externalities in Recruiting
Kräkel, Matthias; Lammers, Frauke; Szech, Nora - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011
According to the previous literature on hiring, ?rms face a trade-off when deciding on external recruiting: From an incentive perspective, external recruiting is harmful since admission of external candidates reduces internal workers’ career incentives. However, if external workers have high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008861935
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Sandbagging
Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011
Participants of dynamic competition games may prefer to play with the rules of the game by systematically withholding e¤ort in the beginning. Such behavior is referred to as sandbagging. I consider a two-period con- test between heterogeneous players and analyze potential sandbagging of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009393201
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Peer Effects and Incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2014
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons in?uence agents? incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096536
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Invader Strategies in the War of Attrition with Private Information
Metzger, Lars Peter - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011
Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some valuations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009189377
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The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play
Dufwenberg, Martin; Gaechter, Simon; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike - University of Bonn, Germany - 2010
Psychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642098