Showing 1 - 10 of 46
sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617906
knowledge. A model of voting-by-feet shows that those norms and institutions arise that maximize expected utility of norm … efficiency. The paper contributes to the literature on voting-by-feet, institutional design, ethics and social preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968383
We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow's ``independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (``Condorcet cycles")....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001501
Participants of dynamic competition games may prefer to play with the rules of the game by systematically withholding e¤ort in the beginning. Such behavior is referred to as sandbagging. I consider a two-period con- test between heterogeneous players and analyze potential sandbagging of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009393201
In innovation contests, the progress of the competing firms in the innovation process is usually their private information. We analyze an innovation contest in which research firms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a fixed cost, but their progress is publicly announced. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008676566
The paper addresses the problem of optimally matching heterogeneous players in a two-stage two-type Lazear-Rosen tournament in which the semifinal losers are eliminated. The organizer of the tournament can either choose two homogeneous semifinals -- one between two strong players and the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651599
such an agreement may play an efficiency-enhancing role. Voters anticipate that voting for extremist parties increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968149
The effects of unproductive lobbying have so far mainly been addressed by the public choice literature on rent-seeking and by Milgrom/Roberts' (1988,1990) work on influence activities in organizations. Our paper makes an attempt to incorporate lobbying into the simple principal-agent framework...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968161
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2) negative welfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment. In a two-player game reciprocation is economically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968325
In their seminal paper, Harrington and Hess (1996) discuss a model where candidates differ along two dimensions - ideology which is modeled by the standard Hotelling-Downs formulation and valence factors which encompass traits which all voters agree as desirable. While valence factor is given,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968339