Similar Search Results

Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies

Kirchkamp, Oliver - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996

We study a model of local evolution. Players are located on a network and play games agains their neighbors. Players are characterized by three properties: (1) The stage game strategies they use agains their neighbors. (2) The repeated game strategy that determines the former. (3) A learning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968201

Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games: An Experimental Study, Part II. Learning

Tang, Fang-Fang - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968207

Fictitious Play in Coordination Games

Sela, Aner; Herreiner, Dorothea K. - University of Bonn, Germany

We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968208

A Learning Approach to Auctions

Monderer, Dov; Hon-Snir, Shlomit; Sela, Aner - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968224

Learning to signal in markets

N; oumlldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - University of Bonn, Germany - 1994

We formulate a dynamic learning-and-adjustment model of a market in which sellers choose signals that potentially reveal their types. If the dynamic process selects a unique limiting outcome, then that outcome must be an undefeated equilibrium; though to be undefeated does not suffice to be the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968265

Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games: An Experimental Study, Part III. Individual Analysis

Tang, Fang-Fang - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968287

Does Information Matter? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game

Apesteguia, Jose - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001

This paper analyzes the effect of the availability of information about the payoff structure on the behavior of players in a Common-Pool Resource game. Six groups of six individuals played a complete information game, while other six groups played the same game but with no information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968350

Can You Guess the Game You're Playing?

Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2000

Recently there has been much theoretical and experimental work on learning in games. However, learning usually means "learning about the strategic behavior of opponents" rather than "learning about the game" as such. In contrast, here we report on an experiment designed to test whether players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968377

Strategic The Two-Person Harvard Game: An Experimental Analysis

Apesteguia, Jose - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001

Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968419

Unawareness, Beliefs and Games

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2007

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are … desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define … restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968356

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last