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Experimental Proof for the Motivational Importance of Reciprocity

Jacobsen, Eva; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996

compared to utilitarian, behavioral, and evolutionary approaches to the question of economic motivation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968314

Break-offs in Bargaining, Evidence from a Video Experiment

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike - University of Bonn, Germany - 1997

In this paper we report on a new methodology of observing subjects behavior in a laboratory situation: Videotaping groups of subjects who have to perform a common task provides information on decision processes that cannot be obtained by another method. We conducted a videotaped bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032196

How Payment Systems Affect Physicians' Provision Behaviour – An Experimental Investigation

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Selten, Reinhard; Wiesen, Daniel - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011

incentives are not the only motivation for physicians’ quantity choices, as patients’ health benefits are of considerable …Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central concern in health economics … research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse the influence of incentives from fee-for-service and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008913273

On Organizational Decision Rules and Innovative Activity

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

for optimal rules in several contexts. A trade-off arises between the use of information and the incentives created by a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968135

Do New Brooms Sweep Clean? - Why and when Dismissing Managers Increases a Firm's Performance

Hvffler, Felix; Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

If a manager stays in office for a long time he will have learned much about his subordinates. Thus competition among them will be weakened as the manager has made up his mind who is suited best for which position. With a new manager the ``rat race'' for favorable tasks is restarted leading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968159

The Design of Incentives in the Presence of Lobbying Activity

Wessels, Joachim H. - University of Bonn, Germany - 1995

-powered incentives in the optimal contract. Secondly, complementing Itoh's findings, we conclude that even if there are no productive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968161

On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

, it may improve their motivation when carrying out decisions. Moreover, delegation to subordinates may be useful to limit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968181

On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001

It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968331

Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability

Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted. Therefore, this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968360

When Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal

Lehmann, Stefanie Aniela - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008

incentives and accordingly is not in the principal’s interest. In this paper I compare two different designs of a collective …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968387