The paper presents an expository account of several experimentally based descriptive theories of cooperation in interactive decision situations. First the equity principle (Selten 1988), prominence in the decimal system (Albers and Albers 1983), and the difference measure of predictive success...

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...

We report on a two-person bargaining experiment, where both players were represented by groups of three persons each. The discussions within the groups were recorded on video tapes and have been transcribed into text protocols. Analyzing the final payoffs and proposals we got several results...

Das fundamentale Werk von John von Neumann und Oskar Morgenstern (1944) hat die Spieltheorie als Gebiet begründet. Es gab zwar vorher schon den in deutscher Sprache veröffentlichen Beitrag von John Neumann (1928) " Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", aber erst mit dem Buch aus dem Jahre 1944...

We report on a two-person bargaining experiment, where both players are represented by groups of three persons each. Both groups negotiate on the division of a given amount. If they do not come to an agreement, they receive a guaranteed payoff which is higher for one group than for the other....

Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side substitutability and cross side complementarity....

According to the previous literature on hiring, ?rms face a trade-off when deciding on external recruiting: From an incentive perspective, external recruiting is harmful since admission of external candidates reduces internal workers’ career incentives. However, if external workers have high...

Participants of dynamic competition games may prefer to play with the rules of the game by systematically withholding e¤ort in the beginning. Such behavior is referred to as sandbagging. I consider a two-period con- test between heterogeneous players and analyze potential sandbagging of...

In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons in?uence agents? incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects,...