Showing 1 - 10 of 92
I consider a situation, where the agent can acquire payoff-relevant information either before or after the contract is signed. To raise efficiency, the principal might solicit information; to retain all surplus, however, she must prevent precontractual information gathering. The following class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651598
This paper analyzes optimal incentive contracts for information acquisition and revelation. A decision maker faces the problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in general not optimal to reward the expert if his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001487
This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result shown by Coughlan...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617906
We formulate a dynamic learning-and-adjustment model of a market in which sellers choose signals that potentially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968265
payoff-based learning models are simulated in order to understand individual learning behavior in distributed systems. Under … the serial mechanism the payoff-assessment learning model (Sarin and Vahid (1997)) provides the best fit to the data …, followed by the experience-weighted attraction learning model (Camerer and Ho (1999)), which in turn, is followed by a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001438
unknown value. A winner’s curse phenomenon arises when subjects bid too high and make losses. Learning direction theory can … quantitative predictions on the basis of learning direction theory. We also look at monotonic ladder processes. It is shown that … account for this. However, other influences on behaviour can also be identified. We introduce impulse balance theory to make …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989615
We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968208
theoretical issues are discussed. Special emphasis is put on aspiration adaptation theory. Further remarks concern basic models of … decision behavior (like learning and expectation formation), reasoning, and the connection between bounded rationality and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968210
learning procedures. We consider the Stochastic Gradient-Algorithm as a boundedly rational learning procedure in an univariate … influence of the forecast feedback is limited the learning agents cannot destabilize the model and learn to form rational …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968237
equilibrium of the game does not organize the individual data, two individual learning models are studied: one following a … predictive value of such learning models is found to be poor. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968350