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How Payment Systems Affect Physicians´ Provision Behaviour – An Experimental Investigation

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Selten, Reinhard; Wiesen, Daniel - University of Bonn, Germany - 2009

. Financial incentives are not the only motivation for physicians' quantity decisions, though. The patient benefit is of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493100

Optimal Incentive Contracts for Experts

Köhler, Wolfgang R. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001487

Emotions and Incentives

Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

the performances of co-workers. Assuming heterogeneity among the workers the interplay of emotions and incentives is … identify certain conditions under which emotions lead to additional incentives and under which the employer benefits from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001507

How Payment Systems Affect Physicians' Provision Behaviour – An Experimental Investigation

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Selten, Reinhard; Wiesen, Daniel - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011

Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central concern in health economics … research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse the influence of incentives from fee-for-service and … incentives are not the only motivation for physicians’ quantity choices, as patients’ health benefits are of considerable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008913273

An experimental test of career concerns

Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht; Raab, Philippe - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989627

On Organizational Decision Rules and Innovative Activity

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

for optimal rules in several contexts. A trade-off arises between the use of information and the incentives created by a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968135

Do New Brooms Sweep Clean? - Why and when Dismissing Managers Increases a Firm's Performance

Hvffler, Felix; Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

If a manager stays in office for a long time he will have learned much about his subordinates. Thus competition among them will be weakened as the manager has made up his mind who is suited best for which position. With a new manager the ``rat race'' for favorable tasks is restarted leading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968159

The Design of Incentives in the Presence of Lobbying Activity

Wessels, Joachim H. - University of Bonn, Germany - 1995

-powered incentives in the optimal contract. Secondly, complementing Itoh's findings, we conclude that even if there are no productive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968161

On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

We examine the question whether a decision should be delegated to a subordinate and whether this is done efficiently. We illustrate that delegation is useful for several reasons. First, it serves to test agents with unknown ability. Then, it may improve their motivation when carrying out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968181

On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation

Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001

It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968331