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Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1984

preferences, results in bargaining inefficiencies: trade often occurs after costly delay. Thus, the model provides an explanation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988753

Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1992

The role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite-horizon alternating-offer model of bargaining. A buyer and … trade exist, but due to the private information, only after costly delay. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988754

Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Cramton, Peter; Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Deneckere, Raymond J. - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2002

folk theorem obtains, so substantial delay is possible and the uninformed party may receive substantial surplus. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988758

Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1991

A buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations. The seller's valuation is common knowledge, but the buyer's valuation is known only by the buyer. Impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources: the traders discount future payoffs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988774

Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1985

payoffs, if the seller's delay costs are higher than those of the buyer, then the bargainers are better off adopting a … sequential bargaining game rather than a static mechanism; however, when the buyer's delay costs are higher, then a static …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988781