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Auction Design for Standard Offer Service

Cramton, Peter; Parece, Andrew; Wilson, Robert - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997

During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988788

A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules

Cramton, Peter; Wilson, Robert - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1998

This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988790

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

Cramton, Peter; Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Milgrom, Paul - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2004

We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988791

The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM

Cramton, Peter; Cameron, Lisa - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1999

Despite their design differences, both the California and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland markets provide explicit roles for competition in the scheduling functions while allowing the ISO to manage the spot market. Experience has shown that both can work.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988792

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1998

An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988793

Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond

Cramton, Peter; Kahn, Alfred E.; Porter, Robert H.; … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2001

Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988794

Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2002

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988795

The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1998

From July 1994 to July 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted nine spectrum auctions, raising … about $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury. The auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Were the auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988796

Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions

Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997

We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction … summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with … combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988797

Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

Cramton, Peter; Ausubel, Lawrence M. - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2004

and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats … for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988798