Similar Search Results

NEW CLASSICALS AND KEYNESIANS, OR THE GOOD GUYS AND THE BAD GUYS.

BARRO, R.J. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808136

MARKET EQUILIBRIA WITH NOT-FOR-PROFIT FIRMS.

PHELPS, C.E.; SENED, I. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808148

THE SEASONAL AND CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF INVENTORIES.

KAHN, J.A. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808179

I'M NOT A HIGH QUALITY FIRM BUT I PLAY ONE ON T.V.: A MODEL OF SIGNALING PRODUCT QUALITY.

HERTZENDORF, M.N. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808181

THE LIFE-CYCLE OF A COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT.

MACDONALD, G.M.; JOVANOVIC, B. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808188

Non-Cooperative, Cooperative and Delegative R&D.

Marjit, S. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503958

Superior Technology and LDC Firms.

Beladi, H.; Marjit, S. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504014

The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral, and Renegociation.

Gorton, G.; Khan, J. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504027

TO TRANSFER OR NOT TO TRANSFER THE BEST TECHNOLOGY UNDER THREAT OF ENTRY- THE CASE OF PRICE COMPETITION.

Kabiraja, T.; Marjit, S. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504036

Optimal Dynamic Lending Contracts with Imperfect Enforceability.

Albuquerque, R.; Hopenhayn, H.A. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1997

In this paper we have developed a general model of borrowing constraints based on the idea of limited enforcement. I our model, borrowing constraints arise as part of the optimal borrowing and lending contract. Our model extends previous theories of borrowing and lending , such as Hart and Moore...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200766