This paper describes a pure-exchange, continuous-time economy with two heterogeneous agents and complete markets. A novel feature of the economy is that agents perceive some security returns as ambiguous in the sense often attributed to frank Knight. The equilibrium is described completely in...

The inability of the Bayesian model to accomodate Ellsberg-type behavior is well known. This paper focuses on another limitation of the Bayesian model, specific to a dynamic setting, namely the inability to permit a distinction between experiments that are identical and those that are only...

Existing models in stochastic continuous-time settings assume that beliefs are represented by a probability measure. As illustrated by the Ellsberg Paradox, this feature rules out a priori any concern with ambiguity. This paper formulates a continuous-time intertemporal version of...

This paper models an agent in a three-period setting who does not update according to Bayes'Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. The agent is rational in the sense that her dynamic behavior is derived from a single stable preference order on a...

When ambiguity averse investors process news of uncertain quality, they act as if they take a worst-case assessment of quality. As a result, they react more strongly to bad news than to good news. They also dislike assets for which information quality is poor, especially when the underlying...

This paper considers learning when the distinction between risk and ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) matters. Working within the framework of recursive multiple-priors utility, the paper formulates a counterpart of the Bayesian model of learning about an uncertain parameter from conditionally...

When ambiguity averse investors process news of uncertain quality, they act as if they take a worst-case assessment of quality. As a result, they react more strongly to bad news than to good news. They also dislike assets for which information quality is poor, especially when the underlying...

This paper models an agent in a three-period setting who does not update according to Bayes'Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. The agent is rational in the sense that her dynamic behavior is derived from a single stable preference order on a...

This paper considers learning when the distinction between risk and ambiguity matters. It first describes thought experiments, dynamic variants of those provided by Ellsberg, that highlight a sense in which the Bayesian learning model is extreme - it models agents who are implausibly ambitious...