Showing 1 - 7 of 7
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with side payments and determine a bound on e so that all sufficiently large games in such a collection have non-empty e -cores. A parameterized collection of games is described by (a) the number of approximate player types and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827261
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty epsilon-core. Our main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572528
We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems for arbitrary games with and without sidepayments. The parameters bound (a) the number of approx-imate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704727
The "law of scarcity" is that scarceness is rewarded; recall, for example, the diamonds and water paradox. In this paper, furthering research initiated in Kelso and Crawford (1982, Econometrica 50, 1483-1504) for matching models, we demonstrate a law of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704736
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a) the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704797
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all suffciently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of epsilon for non-emptiness of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704808
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a large game with limited side payments has a nonempty varepsilon core. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704811