Showing 1 - 10 of 37
We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and risk-neutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one, are privately informed about the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897046
We consider a price discrimination problem in which a seller has a single object for sale to a potential buyer. At the time of contracting, the buyer's private type is his incomplete private information about his value, and the seller can disclose additional private information to the buyer. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850109
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850110
In frictional matching markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers, sellers incur discrete showing costs to show goods to buyers who incur discrete inspection costs to assess the suitability of the goods on offer. We study how brokers can help reduce these costs by managing the level and mix...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850118
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850120
We consider the standard mechanism design environment with linear utility but without monetary transfers. We first establish an equivalence between deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes. We then use this equivalence to construct the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850121
We study mechanism design in a setting where agents know their types but are uncertain about the utility from any alternative. The final realized utility of each agent is observed by the principal and can be contracted upon. In such environments, the principal is not restricted to using only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850134
This paper proposes a nonparametric test of exogenous participation in first-price auctions. Exogenous participation means that the valuation distribution does not depend on the number of bidders. Our test is motivated by the fact that two valuation distributions are the same if and only if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933555
We develop a financial market trading model in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that allows us to incorporate non-trivial volume. We observe that in this model price volatility is positively related to the trading volume and to the absolute value of the net order flow, i.e. the order...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004961444
We provide a three way theoretical comparison of dealer, limit order, and hybrid markets and analyze the impact that the organization of trading has on volume, liquidity, and price efficiency. We find, in particular, that trading volume is highest in the limit order market and lowest in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012905