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Communication, Timing, and Common Learning

Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2010

We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common learning). If … messages do not report dispatch times, communication prevents common learning under general conditions even if common knowledge … is acquired without communication. If messages report dispatch times, communication can destroy common learning under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513291

Tawney's Century (1540-1640): the Roots of Modern Capitalist Entrepreneurship in England

Munro, John H. - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2007

Richard Tawney (1880-1962), who taught at the London School of Economics from 1917 to 1949, was unquestionably one of the very most important economic historians that England has ever produced: so much so, indeed, that the era of his major research and publications, 1540 - 1640, has justly come...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704824

Discriminatory Information Disclosure

Li, Hao; Shi, Xianwen - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013

We consider a price discrimination problem in which a seller has a single object for sale to a potential buyer. At the time of contracting, the buyer's private type is his incomplete private information about his value, and the seller can disclose additional private information to the buyer. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850109

Optimal Voting Rules

Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013

We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850110

Information Externalities and Intermediaries in Frictional Search Markets

Shi, Xianwen; Siow, Aloysius - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013

In frictional matching markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers, sellers incur discrete showing costs to show goods to buyers who incur discrete inspection costs to assess the suitability of the goods on offer. We study how brokers can help reduce these costs by managing the level and mix...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850118

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850120

Optimal Mechanism Design without Money

Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013

We consider the standard mechanism design environment with linear utility but without monetary transfers. We first establish an equivalence between deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes. We then use this equivalence to construct the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850121

Implementation with Securities

Deb, Rahul; Mishra, Debasis - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013

We study mechanism design in a setting where agents know their types but are uncertain about the utility from any alternative. The final realized utility of each agent is observed by the principal and can be contracted upon. In such environments, the principal is not restricted to using only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850134

A Nonparametric Test of Exogenous Participation in First-Price Auctions

Liu, Nianqing; Luo, Yao - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2014

This paper proposes a nonparametric test of exogenous participation in first-price auctions. Exogenous participation means that the valuation distribution does not depend on the number of bidders. Our test is motivated by the fact that two valuation distributions are the same if and only if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933555

Integrated-quantile-based estimation for first price auction models

Luo, Yao; Wan, Yuanyuan - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2015

This paper considers nonparametric estimation of first-price auction models under the monotonicity restriction on the bidding strategy. Based on an integrated-quantile representation of the first-order condition, we propose a tuning-parameter-free estimator for the valuation quantile function....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011273266