A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue costly search. Alternatives are described by several distinct attributes. Each committee member privately assesses the quality of one attribute (her \

We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of...

We study how the predictive power of level-k models changes as we perturb the classical beauty contest setting along two dimensions: the strength of the coordination motive and the information symmetry. We use the Morris and Shin (2002) model as the unified framework for our study, and find that...

Empirical models of strategic games are central to much analysis in marketing and economics. However, two challenges in applying these models to real world data are that such models often admit multiple equilibria and that they require strong informational assumptions. The first implies that the...

I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder's type. Multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in...

I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder\\'s type. Parameters permit the existence of multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding...

Corporation tax systems around the world treat gains and losses asymmetrically. This paper examines the impact of changing the refundability of tax losses in a cash flow tax system. A dynamic game of complete information is used to analyse refund policies in an imperfectly competitive setting....

We study how the presence of multiple participation opportunities coupled with private learning about payoffs affects the ability of agents to coordinate efficiently in global coordination games. Two players face the option to invest irreversibly in a project in one of many rounds. The project...

We present a Bayesian framework based on the finite hierarchies of beliefs to study the decision problems in strategic form games. The model allows us to analyze the behavior of bounded rational players as well as that of fully rational players. We define the degree of ``boundedness'' by the...

When human capital skills differ in their ability to attract offers from alternative employers, a potential inefficiency in human capital investment arises. If a worker's output is observed by the labour market only when the worker invests in self-promoting activities, then high-ability workers...