Sanctions are a means to provide incentives towards more pro-social behavior. Yet their implementation can be a signal that past behavior was undesirable. We investigate experimentally the importance of the informational content of the choice to sanction. We place this in a context of a...

Incentivized methods for eliciting subjective probabilities in economic experiments present the subject with risky choices or bets that encourage truthful reporting. We discuss the most prominent elicitation methods and their underlying assumptions, provide theoretical comparisons, and propose...

We introduce tests for finite sample multivariate linear regressions with heteroskedastic errors that have mean zero. We assume bounds on endoge- nous variables but do not make additional assumptions on errors. The tests are exact, i.e., they have guaranteed type I error probabilities. We...

We present methods of belief elicitation which are applicable for any non-trivial utility function. Unlike existing techniques that account for deviations from risk-neutrality, these methods are highly transparent to sub- jects. Rather than identifying beliefs exactly we identify bounds on...

We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...