Mispricing (the dierence between prices and their underlying fundamental values) is an important characteristic of markets. The literature on the topic consists of many dierent measures. This state of aairs is unsatisfactory, since dierent measures may produce dierent results. Stockl et al....

We present methods of belief elicitation which are applicable for any non-trivial utility function. Unlike existing techniques that account for deviations from risk-neutrality, these methods are highly transparent to sub- jects. Rather than identifying beliefs exactly we identify bounds on...

Recent studies in high-income industrialized countries have shown that equivalence scales are income-dependent. We investigate whether this dependence also holds in poorer, services oriented countries, by considering the example of Cyprus. We also examine whether household economies of scale and...

This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large society of rational agents. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poison processes. Each agent forms his belief...

Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium. The present paper explores the relation of this concept to Nash...

Using a group identity manipulation we examine the role of social preferences in an experimental one-shot centipede game. Contrary to what social preference theory would predict, we fnd that players continue longer when playing with outgroup members. The explanation we provide for this result...

We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...

Maskin and Tirole have defined payoff-relevant states in discrete time dynamic games with observable actions in terms of a partition of the set of histories. Their proof that this partition is unique cannot be applied, when action spaces are infinite or when players are unable to condition on...

The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distingueshed node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory...

Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non-existence of equilibrium has puzzled many economists. In this paper we approach this problem from an evo- lutionary point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies...