We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.

In incomplete information environments with transferable utility, efficient outcomes are generally implementable unless interim or ex post participation constraints are imposed on the problem. In this paper we show that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but possibly unrelated...

This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents\' valuations are private information. For a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we characterize the optimal mechanism, and show that it involves bundling. Bundling alleviates the...

Comparing monopoly bundling with separate sales is relatively straightforward in an environment with a large number of goods. In this paper we show that results that are similar to the asymptotic results can be obtained in the more realistic case with a given finite number of goods provided that...