Is conformity amongst similar individuals consistent with self-interested behavior? We consider a model of incomplete information in which each player receives a signal, interpreted as an allocation to a role, and can make his action choice conditional on his role. Our main result demonstrates...

Treating games of incomplete information with countable sets of actions and types and finite but large player sets we demonstrate that for every mixed strategy profile there is a pure strategy profile that is 'epsilon-equivalent'. Our framework introduces and exploits a distinction between...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant gametheoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

We introduce a new approach to showing existence of equilibrium in models of economies with unbounded short sales. Inspired by the pioneering works of Hart (1974) on asset market models, Grandmont (1977) on temporary economic equilibrium, and of Werner (1987) on general equilibrium exchange...

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second- mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental- standard levels. We introduce this feature to...

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second-mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental-standard levels. We introduce this feature to an...

We introduce a no-risky-arbitrage price (NRAP) condition for asset market models allowing both unbounded short sales and externalities such as trading volume. We then demonstrate that the NRAP condition is sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence of externalities....

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second mover advantage.' A key feature of standards is that, unlike public goods as usually defined, all firms do not unanimously prefer higher standard...

We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in size. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs, which simply ensures that...