We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second-mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental-standard levels. We introduce this feature to an...

This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential superadditivity -- an option open to a group of players is to partition into...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant gametheoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

We introduce a new approach to showing existence of equilibrium in models of economies with unbounded short sales. Inspired by the pioneering works of Hart (1974) on asset market models, Grandmont (1977) on temporary economic equilibrium, and of Werner (1987) on general equilibrium exchange...

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow that specifies a plan for carrying bads through the network from a base to a...

This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory �subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperativegame. Our approach rests on two fundamental ideas: (1) Given an extensive game, the formationof a coalition leads to...

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second- mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental- standard levels. We introduce this feature to...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant gametheoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

We introduce a new approach to showing existence of equilibrium in models of economies with unbounded short sales. Inspired by the pioneering works of Hart (1974) on asset market models, Grandmont (1977) on temporary economic equilibrium, and of Werner (1987) on general equilibrium exchange...