Showing 1 - 10 of 51
A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation graph have nonnegative length for every integer k � 2. Saks and Yu...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024825
The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from markets with concave utility functions generate totally balanced games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008624634
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585306
This article establishes versions of Moulin's [On strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980), 31--38] characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain consists of all profiles of single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary subset...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800718
Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585291
We develop and explore a new model of the economics of privacy. Previous work has focused on "privacy of type," wherein an agent privately knows an immutable characteristic. We consider "privacy of action," wherein privacy means that an agent's choice of action is unobservable to others. To show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595886
For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459255
We introduce a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agents' cost shares in any possible jurisdiction to which the agent might belong. We provide an axiomatic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459261
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459264
Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices that would have been made in appropriate counterfactual choice situations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459270