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Cores of Many-Player Games; Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment

Wooders, Myrna - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2009

of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential superadditivity -- an … core. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352207

Market Games and Clubs

Wooders, Myrna - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2009

small groups of participants can realize almost all gains to coalition formation. The equivalence of games with many players …: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008624634

Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

Weymark, John A. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2000

A voting procedure is candidate stable if no candidate would prefer to withdraw from an election when all of the other potential candidates enter. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton have recently established a number of theorems showing that candidate stability is incompatible with some other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034028

Social Choice with Analytic Preferences

Breton, Michel Le; Weymark, John A. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2000

Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034031

Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees

Serizawa, Shigehiro; Weymark, John A. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2002

For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459255

Status Equilibrium for Local Public Good Economies

Nouweland, Anne van den; Wooders, Myrna H. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2005

We introduce a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agents' cost shares in any possible jurisdiction to which the agent might belong. We provide an axiomatic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459261

Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

Ehlers, Lars; Weymark, John A. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2001

A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459264

On Kolm's Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory

Weymark, John A. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2005

Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices that would have been made in appropriate counterfactual choice situations....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459270

Measurement Theory and the Foundations of Utilitarianism

Weymark, John A. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2005

This article reconsiders the Harsanyi--Sen debate concerning whether Harsanyi is justified in interpreting his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems as providing axiomatizations of utilitarianism. Sen's criticism and its formalization by Weymark are based on the claim that von...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459272

Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property

Weymark, John A. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2004

A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585306