Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 12
Cover Image
The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement
Daughety, Andrew; Reinganum, Jennifer - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2014
A significant policy concern about the emerging plaintiff legal funding industry is that loans will undermine settlement. When the plaintiff has private information about damages, we find that the optimal (plaintiff-funder) loan induces all plaintiff types to make the same demand, resulting in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261645
Cover Image
Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services
Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2011
equilibrium the first lawyer visited demands a higher contingent fee for lower-valued cases, signaling the case�s value to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320347
Cover Image
Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency
Daughtey, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2010
equilibrium the first lawyer visited demands a higher contingent fee for lower-valued cases, signaling the case�s value to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008692911
Cover Image
The effect of third-party funding of plaintiffs on settlement
Daughety, Andrew; Reinganum, Jennifer - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2013
In this paper we use a signaling model to analyze the effect of (endogenously-determined) third-party non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610155
Cover Image
The effect of third-party funding of plaintiffs on settlement
Daughety, Andrew; Reinganum, Jennifer - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2013
In this paper we use a signaling model to analyze the effect of (endogenously-determined) third-party non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693397
Cover Image
Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling
Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2005
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally- and vertically-differentiated substitute products. We find that incomplete information about vertical quality (e.g., consumer satisfaction) that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459269
Cover Image
Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information
Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2006
paper we show that the combination of multi-agent simultaneous signaling of private information, and the nature of the … commitment to provide greater effort. We find that this non-cooperative, simultaneous signaling need not be wasteful, and can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752717
Cover Image
Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling
Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2007
through a credible direct claim; 2) signaling of quality via producer actions that influence buyersÕ beliefs about quality. In … general, these two literatures have ignored one-another. In this paper we argue that disclosure and signaling are two sides of … integration of these two alternatives leads to a number of new implications about disclosure, signaling, firm preferences over …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752756
Cover Image
Privacy, Publicity, and Choice
Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2008
We develop and explore a new model of the economics of privacy. Previous work has focused on "privacy of type," wherein an agent privately knows an immutable characteristic. We consider "privacy of action," wherein privacy means that an agent's choice of action is unobservable to others. To show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595886
Cover Image
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2006
costs that would induce a high-safety firm to choose disclosure over signaling. When the firm�s full marginal cost is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595892