This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of regional exhaustion of intellectual property, a policy regime under which a set of countries permit parallel imports from one another but not from the rest of the world. A three-country model is developed in which two high-income countries...

This paper analyzes economic linkages between the exhaustion and protection of intellectual property. We consider a North-South model, where a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North by virtue of an intellectual property right (IPR) -- such as a patent or a trademark -- has the incentive...

We develop a North-South model in which a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North (by virtue of a patent or a trademark) has the incentive to price discriminate internationally because Northern consumers value its product more than Southern ones. While North's policy regarding the...

We develop a North-South model in which a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North (by virtue of a patent or a trademark) has the incentive to price discriminate internationally because Northern consumers value its product more than Southern ones. While North's policy regarding the...

We develop a North-South model in which a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North (by virtue of a patent or a trademark) has the incentive to price discriminate internationally because Northern consumers value its product more than Southern ones. While North's policy regarding the...

We develop a North-South model in which a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North (by virtue of a patent or a trademark) has the incentive to price discriminate internationally because Northern consumers value its product more than Southern ones. While North's policy regarding the...

In a North-South vertically differentiated duopoly, we derive equilibrium government policies towards parallel imports (PIs). By incorporating strategic interaction at the policy-setting stage and the product market, the model sheds new light on (i) the effects of PI policies on pricing behavior...

This paper shows that parallel import policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. We demonstrate this result in two-country international duopoly where a domestic monopolist competes with a rival firm in the foreign market if it chooses to incur the fixed investment cost of...

In an international trading economy where countries set tariffs strategically, modeled using a Cobb-Douglas example, this paper studies the relationship between the structure and the performance of the world market. Using new results from monotone comparative statics in a Shapley-Shubik market...

We explore the interplay of market structure and government trade policy in the context of a heterogenous goods duopoly model (allowing for goods to be substitutes or complements) wherein governments simultaneously and noncooperatively choose whether or not to provide subsidies for their firms...