This Handbook chapter provides a brief review of selected settlement bargaining models in some areas where new work is developing and where additional work is likely to yield yet further important results. This work has focused on what might be thought of as the environment of the settlement...

This Handbook chapter provides a brief review of selected settlement bargaining models in some areas where new work is developing and where additional work is likely to yield yet further important results. This work has focused on what might be thought of as the environment of the settlement...

This Handbook chapter provides a brief review of selected settlement bargaining models in some areas where new work is developing and where additional work is likely to yield yet further important results. This work has focused on what might be thought of as the environment of the settlement...

A significant policy concern about the emerging plaintiff legal funding industry is that loans will undermine settlement. When the plaintiff has private information about damages, we find that the optimal (plaintiff-funder) loan induces all plaintiff types to make the same demand, resulting in...

This Handbook chapter provides a brief review of selected settlement bargaining models in some areas where new work is developing and where additional work is likely to yield yet further important results. This work has focused on what might be thought of as the environment of the settlement...

We show that, in the context of the market for a professional service, adverse selection problems can sufficiently exacerbate moral hazard considerations so that even though all agents are risk neutral, welfare can be reduced by allowing the agent to �buy the firm� from the principal....

We model the game between an informed seller (a lawyer) and an uninformed buyer (a potential client) over the choice of compensation for the lawyer to take a case to trial, when there is post-contracting investment by the lawyer (effort at trial) that involves moral hazard. Clients incur a...

In this paper we use a signaling model to analyze the effect of (endogenously-determined) third-party non-recourse loans to plaintiffs on settlement bargaining when a plaintiff has private information about the value of her suit. We show that an optimal loan (i.e., one that maximizes the joint...

In this paper we use a signaling model to analyze the effect of (endogenously-determined) third-party non-recourse loans to plaintiffs on settlement bargaining when a plaintiff has private information about the value of her suit. We show that an optimal loan (i.e., one that maximizes the joint...

A significant policy concern about the emerging plaintiff legal funding industry is that loans will undermine settlement. When the plaintiff has private information about damages, we find that the optimal (plaintiff-funder) loan induces all plaintiff types to make the same demand, resulting in...