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We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213817
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261641
: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008624634
of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential superadditivity -- an … core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352207
game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any … coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered … core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458185
and Wooders (1986) to obtain nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate, under the stronger condition of … strict small group effectiveness, that the equal treatment core coincides with the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes … equilibrium follows from nonemptiness of the core and equivalence of the core to the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our approach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595878