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See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity

Steiger, Eva-Maria; Zultan, Ro'i - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

of one agent's contribution is larger as more agents contribute, an information chain is as effective in inducing …, information chains induce higher cooperation in early movers compared to a no-transparency treatment and in late movers compared … to a full-transparency treatment. Thus, partial information can be used to balance the positive and negative effects of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942883

Positive self-image and incentives in organizations

Santos-Pinto, Luís - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2003

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837521

Incentives and optimal antitrust policy

Jellal, Mohamed; Souam, Said - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of … the collected fine or providing him with information which enhances the probability of the success of the prosecution …. When the marginal cost of providing the relevant information is relatively high, the antitrust authority equally shares the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111727

Fairness and Contract Design

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785926

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005157507

Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649797

Performance Pay and Risk Aversion

Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835229

Payment Scheme Changes and Effort Provision: The Effect of Digit Ratio

Neyse, Levent; Friedl, Andreas; Schmidt, Ulrich - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Economic experiments report that individuals perform better under a piece rate payment scheme in comparison to a fixed payment scheme. The reason is straightforward: incentives motivate people, and without incentives they decrease their effort. Yet women are prone to choose a fixed payment over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114467

Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation

Rei, Claudia - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

The different organizational structure of the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires affected their ability to monitor workers. I test the theoretical implications of these differences using micro data of overseas workers' compensation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008835364

Incentive Effects in Asymmetric Tournaments Empirical Evidence from the German Hockey League

Nieken, Petra; Stegh, Michael - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

Following tournament theory, incentives will be rather low if the contestants of a tournament are heterogeneous. We empirically test this prediction using a large dataset from the German Hockey League. Our results show that indeed the intensity of a game is lower if the teams are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633333