Using both household and linked-employer-employee data we study the effects of works councils on individual sickness absence rates and a subjective measure of personnel problems due to absenteeism in Germany. We find that the existence of a works council is positively correlated with the...

We implement a laboratory experiment in which a principal has to decide on monitoring intensity and pay to investigate whether they are complements or substitutes. Wage level, monitoring intensity, and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization...

Empirical studies find that the age-variance profile of wages is U-shaped. The objective of this paper is to explore the driving forces of the U-shape in a model with search frictions. I introduce endogenous search effort and a fixed retirement age into Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin s (2006)...

This study uses rich information on performance outcomes to estimate the effect of bonus pay on worker productivity. We use a policy discontinuity in the call centre of a multi-national telephone company in which management introduced monetary bonuses upon achieving pre-defined performance...

Recent laboratory evidence suggests that employees who have the extraordinary right to self-determine their wages perform better. By conducting a natural field experiment, we aim to test whether this policy actually has the predicted positive effects in a real-labor market. Employees were hired...

This paper investigates the effects of different prize structures on the effort choices of participants in two-stage elimination contests. A format with a single prize is shown to maximize total effort over both stages, but induces low effort in stage 1 and high effort in stage 2. By contrast, a...

Traditionally, it has been argued that profit sharing can increase employment and welfare because it lowers marginal labour costs without reducing labour income. In this paper, we show that profit sharing can also represent a Pareto-improvement if labour supply is excessive due to relative...

We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers allocated bonuses to their employees based on subjective...

Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the bottom, or both. In this paper we test the effectiveness and efficiency of these incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize optimal contracts in a principal-agent setting, using a...

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...