Showing 1 - 10 of 65
that a large portion of the detected herding can be explained by identical trading among funds of the same investment …, international and therefore complex investment universe. Further, we approximate a fund s portfolio complexity by its size and find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010955223
undertakes a location-specific investment that is not contractible. When long-term contracts are feasible, the regulator averts …-term contracts are feasible, contracts with positive transfers in the second period cannot be implemented if the firm's investment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164135
We study a sequential screening problem where the agent produces an object consisting of multiple items and has a multidimensional type that he learns over time. Depending on the strength of complementarity/substitutability of the items, the optimal allocation features a different pattern of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164175
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986082
In a principal-agent setup, we investigate agents disclosure of conflict of interests revealing deliberate or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164118
This paper derives the optimal financial contract when a borrowing entrepreneur can evade taxes in a model of costly … standard debt contracts are not optimal when tax evasion is possible. Instead, the optimal contract is debt-like only for very …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164001
-term contract that has to be renegoti- ated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a …-term contracts. First, it explains why parties often abstain from writing a beneficial long-term contract or why some contracts … allocation of ownership rights to protect relationship-specific investments rather than writing a specific performance contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164113
contractible. If the firm can make a take-it-or leave-it offer, the optimal contract is also state-dependent but always suboptimal … leading to agency costs due inequity aversion. If the parties bargain over the optimal contract, the optimal division of … surplus is more equitable compared to the case with a purely selfish worker. Moreover, the optimal contract with bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957968
-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a …-term contracts. First, it explains why parties often abstain from writing a beneficial long-term contract or why some contracts … allocation of ownership rights to protect relationship-specific investments rather than writing a specific performance contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957990
Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958061