The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members fight against each other about the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the...

Earlier work established the notion that international terrorism harms international trade. This evidence was based on annual data with responses in the same year as attacks and incidents and on empirical models which ignored general equilibrium effects. We provide evidence that, if at all,...

This contribution studies the influence of poor politico-economic factors, unfavorable demographic conditions, state failure, modernization, secularization, globalization and the perceived dependency of the Islamic world from the West on the onset of armed Islamist activity for 155 countries...

This paper studies the influence of interregional inequality within countries on internal conflicts. Regional inequalities are measured by the population-weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita. As the main innovation, I use a panel data set of country-level regional...

This contribution examines the role of market-capitalism in anti-American terrorism. It differentiates between level- and rate-of-change-effects associated with market-capitalist development and their respective relationship with anti-U.S. violence. While this contribution argues that higher...

Initiating a conflict is an investment in social, political or economic change. The decision to attack is sequential in time, irreversible and, more important, includes highly uncertain and erratic threats and opportunities yet completely disregarded in confict theory. In this dynamic model of...

This contribution investigates the role of education in domestic terrorism for 133 countries between 1984 and 2007. The findings point at a nontrivial effect of education on terrorism. Lower education (primary education) tends to promote terrorism in a cluster of countries where the...

We analyze the interplay of group identity and inter-group conflict in a contest where each of two conflicting groups can develop either a group or an individualistic identity. Contest structures impact on the adoption of identities which themselves influence behavior in the contest. We show the...

The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the...

We show theoretical and experimental results that demonstrate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision making and deliberation. We present a model in which committee members have career concerns and unanimity is needed to change the status quo. We study three scenarios -...