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Buy-it-Now Prices in eBay Auctions The Field in the Lab

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Grebe, Tim; Kröger, Sabine - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

In eBay s Buy-it-Now auctions sellers can post prices at which buyers can purchase a good prior to an auction. We study how sellers set Buy-it-Now prices when buyers have independent private values for a single object for sale. We test the predictions of a model by combining the real auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163964

Bidding in common value fair division games

Brünner, Tobias; Becker, Alice - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

In a fair division game an indivisible object with an unknown common value is owned by a group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while the others are compensated monetarily. Implementing fair division games in the lab, we fi nd many occurrences of the winner's curse under the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986004

An Experimental Study of Precautionary Bidding

Kocher, Martin; Pahlke, Julius; Trautmann, Stefan - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

Auctions often involve goods exhibiting a common knowledge ex-post risk. Precautionary bidding predicts that under expected utility, ex-post risk leads DARA bidders to reduce their bids by more than the appropriate risk premium. Because the degree of riskiness of the good, and bidders risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957987

Gender Differences in Competition and Sabotage

Dato, Simon; Nieken, Petra - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent s output, we find that males and … significantly more sabotage leading to an on average higher winning probability but not to higher profits. If the gender of the … is female. The gender gap in sabotage is persistent. We discuss possible explanations for our findings and their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958084

Do Women Have More Shame than Men? An Experiment on Self-Assessment and the Shame of Overestimating Oneself

Ludwig, Sandra; Thoma, Carmen - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

they overestimated themselves. Men, however, do not seem to be similarly shame-averse. This gender difference may be due to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958183

Dynamic Contests with Feedback and Heterogeneity: Empirical Evidence from a Gaming App

Hett, Florian - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

This paper empirically analyzes how performance feedback and information on heterogeneity affect behavior in dynamic contests, using data on two-player-contests from a smartphone/tablet application called ``Wordblitz for Friends''. We find that players increase output as underdogs and decrease...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163907

Bidder Contests in International Mergers and Acquisitions: The Impact of Toeholds, Preemptive Bidding, and Termination Fees

Schneck, Colin; Bessler, Wolfgang; Zimmermann, Jan - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

We study for a sample of international mergers and acquisitions the effectiveness of three takeover bidding strategies first in preventing bidder contests and second, if a contest has occurred, in increasing the probability of a successful offer. Our results indicate that support for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163950

Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement

Rosar, Frank; Mueller, Florian - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163981

Reference-Dependent Bidding in Dynamic Auctions

Ott, Marion; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

We investigate equilibrium bidding behavior of bidders with reference-dependent preferences and independent private values in single-unit English and Dutch clock auctions. Bidders' reference points are endogenous and determined by their strategy and their beliefs about the other bidders. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164143

Continuous Time Contests with Private Information

Seel, Christian; Stracky, Philipp - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

This paper introduces a class of contest models in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. We prove existence and uniqueness of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212440