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What niche did human cooperativeness evolve in?

Rusch, Hannes - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2013

the evolution of cooperative behaviour in humans and other species. Many effective mechanisms and promotive scenarios have … cooperation research is presented, followed by two new objections to such an exclusive focus on PD-based models of social … cooperation themselves came to cooperate: Behavioural and/or psychological mechanisms which evolved for other, possibly more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010663004

Phylogenetic Footprints in Organizational Behavior

Witt, Ulrich; Schwesinger, Georg - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2012

An evolutionary tool kit is applied in this paper to explain how innate social behavior traits evolved in early human groups. These traits were adapted to the particular production requirements of the group in human phylogeny. They shaped the group members' attitudes towards contributing to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894141

Demographic transition and political stability: Does corruption matter?

Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza; Witthuhn, Stefan - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2014

A demographic transition resulting from an increase in the size of the young working age population can be a blessing or a curse for economic performance. We focus on the political stability effects of a larger youth population and hypothesize that corruption matters in this nexus. Using panel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096548

Strategic Interaction and Externalities: FD-games and pollution.

Joosten, Reinoud - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2004

To analyze strategic interaction which may induce externalities, we designed Bathroom Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs. Two people regularly use a bathroom, before leaving they can either clean up the mess made, or not. Cleaning up involves an effort, so this option always gives a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247906

Attractive evolutionary equilibria

Joosten, Reinoud; Roorda, Berend - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2011

We present attractiveness, a renement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009386643

Towards an Incentive Salience Model of Intertemporal Choice

Lades, Leonhard K. - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2011

This theoretical paper presents an incentive salience model of intertemporal choice. The model is a variation of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. Based on the distinction between 'wanting' and 'liking', the paper presents one possible explanation of impulsive choices of smaller sooner...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009386644

A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs.

Joosten, R. - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2005

Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765308

Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory

Joosten, Reinoud; Roorda, Berend - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2008

We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765317

Paul Samuelson's critique and equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory

Joosten, Reinoud - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2009

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts all nearby trajectories...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008476351

Strategic Advertisement with Externalities: A New Dynamic Approach

Joosten, Reinoud - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2007

We model and analyze strategic interaction over time in a duopolis-tic market. Each period the firms independently and simultaneously choose whether to advertise or not. Advertising increases the own immediate sales, but may also cause an externality, e.g., increase or decrease the immediate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005055382