We study experimentally voluntary contributions to public goods when none, some, or all previous decisions are observable. When agents observe previous moves, they tend to condition their cooperation on observed cooperation. This leads to two effects of increased transparency: on the one hand,...

The rise of the extreme poles in the European political Spectrum, corresponds currently with a clear call for help by the site of simple People, combined with the desire for a serious confrontation with the tragic impasse reproduced by the extreme Problems of the everyday live . In this case,...

This work provides experimental evidence of the determinants of tax compliance in Mexico, and compares them to the results of an experiment administered in the United States reported by Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992). The results for both countries are contrasted to the predictions of the...

Agricultural and rural development policies have had and have a great influence in developing areas over others, by intensifying the use of land and the abandonment of others, with effect on exodus of rural population to urban areas, soil erosion, the continued decline of many species and...

Safety is costly, but lack of safety can be even more expensive. This contribution considers the various dimensions of “Economics of Safety”, ranging from safety at work to road safety, terrorism and crime. Economic science helps to understand the role of safety as a (public or private) good...

We provide a quantitative assessment of the welfare cost of tax competition or, equivalently, the welfare benefit of international tax policy cooperation. We use a simple multi-country general equilibrium model of a world economy, in which there are two types of cross-country spillovers: the...

This paper considers a model of voluntary public good provision with two players and convex costs. I demonstrate that the provision of public good is higher in the sequential framework under fairly general conditions. This outcome shows that introducing convex costs may reverse under some...

The efficiency of “quasimarkets”—decentralized public goods provision subjected to Tiebout competition—is a staple of public choice conventional wisdom. Yet in the 1990s a countermovement in political economy called “neoconsolidationism” began to challenge this wisdom. The...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...