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On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2002
In this paper it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a 'simple' contract that the parties have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836090
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Principal-Agent Settings with Random Shocks
Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
Using a gift exchange experiment, we show that the ability of reciprocity to overcome incentive problems inherent in principal-agent settings is greatly reduced when the agent’s effort is distorted by random shocks and transmitted imperfectly to the principal. Specifically, we find that gift...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011157030
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Multi-dimensional auctions under information asymmetry for costs and qualities
Papakonstantinou, A.; Bogetoft, P. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This paper discusses the design of a novel multi-dimensional mechanism which allows a principal to procure a single project or an item from multiple suppliers through a two-step payment. The suppliers are capable of producing different qualities at costs which cannot exceed a certain value and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259763
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Gouvernance optimale moderne des universités
Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
the approach of the paradigm of the theory of incentives Laffont and Tirole (1993), this paper discusses the effects of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108454
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Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation
Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert C. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
of two periods. The firm can undertake a location-specific investment (e.g., in abatement capital). Contracts can be … written on some contractible productive activity (e.g., emissions), but the firm's investment is not contractible. A moral … severe that higher transfers are needed to avert relocation compared to a (hypothetical) situation without the investment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929704
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Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism
Shchetinin, Oleg - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
contract theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999184
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The Role of Investment Banks in IPOs and Incentives in Firms: Essays in Financial and Behavioral Economics
Bartling, Björn - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008520723
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Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship: Economic Theory and practical Implications: The Case of North Carolina
Schmid, Andreas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
providers. An introduction to relevant aspects of contract theory is followed by their adaptation to the characteristics of the … conflicts of interest once a contract has been sealed (ex post). The theory based conclusions are contrasted with the situation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574266
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La funzione economica del contratto di servizio nella trasformazione in spa delle aziende di servizi pubblici locali
Termini, Valeria; Cella, Michela - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1999
contract theory. The article shows how the service contract, introduced after formal privatization, changes the incentives and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468142
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A Soft Budget Constraint Explanation for the Venture Capital Cycle
Gebhardt, Georg - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
We explore why venture capital funds limit the amount of capital they raise and do not reinvest the proceeds. This structure is puzzling because it leads to a succession of several funds financing each new venture which multiplies the well known agency problems. We argue that an inside investor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005614481