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An anti corruption mechansim
Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necesarily know the supervisor’s preferences.We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259731
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NCAA Athletic Departments: An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Revenue and Conference Changes
Pincin, Jared; Hoffer, Adam - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
The paper uses a panel of athletic department revenue and expenditure data of 227 public colleges and universities to empirically investigate the behavior of NCAA Division I athletic departments over the period 2006 – 2011. Four primary hypotheses were tested: (1) the effect of revenue changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260960
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Organization of Indian Health Bureaucracy and its Delivery System
K., Srinivasan; Raka, Sharan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
The aim of this paper is to probe into the structure and functioning of health bureaucracy in India with specific … reference to rural health bureaucracy of Tamil Nadu State. bureaucracy is defined as "a hierarchical division of staff who act … on formal assignments" - Gouldner(1954). This definition suggests five specific dimensions of bureaucracy namely (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260082
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ LENDING TO PAKISTAN
Anwar, Mumtaz - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
This paper analyzes the determinants of multilateral aid from international financial institutions (IFIs) to Pakistan, focusing on the world three major IFIs, the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB. Political economic factors, notably bureaucratic interests and major shareholders economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836381
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Meritocratic Aspects Concerning Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector - A Case Study for Romania
Matei, Ani; Matei, Lucica - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
performance for a public organisation, which represents by excellence a bureaucracy. Therefore, the evaluation of the "distance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533696
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Darke Side of Social Capital Social Preferences and Corruption
Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027124
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Bureaucracy and Corruption Taxation Proof
Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of bribery between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027137
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Pensioners' travel concessions - a misallocation of resources
Musgrave, Ralph S. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
Everyone has a soft spot for pensioners. This probably explains most peoples’ unquestioning approval of pensioners’ travel concessions. However, it is argued here that concessions do not make sense because pensioners would be better off with the cash equivalent of their concessions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005620186
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An Incentive-Compatibility Approach to the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau
Claar, Victor V - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1997
An incentive-compatibility framework for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs is applied to the sponsor’s problem of monitoring a bureau. Following Mueller (1989), the bureau does not make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals to the sponsor. Rather, the bureau must announce a marginal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621692
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Holding together regionalism and the interaction of functional bureaucracies
Libman, Alexander; Vinokurov, Evgeny - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
adversely affect the interests of functional bureaucracy to support regional integration given the cutting off the existing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568340