This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict....

This article estimates returns to scale and monopolistic markups on a large sample of Polish firms in the manufacturing and services sectors during 1996-2004. Methodology based on instrumental variables allows joint estimation of both, scale elasticities as well as markups, while the unobserved...

If the output market is perfectly competitive and the firm’s production function is not concave, an increase in the output price may lead to an explosive increase in firm’s profits at some point. We explore the properties of this point, called a threshold price. We derive the formula for the...

In the whole world there are strong discussions on how to yield a more equitable access and a more efficient provision. One issue linked to efficiency is the achievement of scale economies in the industry, and the optimal dimension of water and sanitation providers. Changes in the industrial...

While exports within NAFTA face a lower hazard, its onset has increased the hazard of exporting between the members, though intra-NAFTA exports still enjoy a lower hazard. There are differences in the timing of the effect of NAFTA across the three members. Unlike the effect on Canadian exports,...

In empirical regional economics, returns to scale are typically estimated at the regional level in search for evidence on alternative theories of growth and agglomeration. However, returns to scale may also have a firm-level dimension. In this paper, we exploit micro level data and estimate the...

This paper studies the aggregate substitution and expansion effects triggered by changes in input prices in a context where firms supply a homogeneous commodity and compete in quantities à la Cournot. We derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium and show that this...