Showing 1 - 10 of 176
multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network …We study experimentally how the network structure and length of pre-play communication affect behavior and outcome in a … coordination and distribution of coordinated outcomes across networks. But increasing the communication length improves both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008587475
A new mechanism that substantially mitigates social dilemmas is examined theoretically and experimentally. It resembles the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) except that in each decision round subjects are ranked and then grouped according to their public contribution. The game has multiple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621227
This paper revisited Gregory Bateson’s theory of hierarchical learning through an experiment testing the existence of … first part of the experiment is seen as a kind of training period. The different treatments of the coordination game are, in … context effect and learning spill-over in two following games: a coordination game and a two-step battle-of-the sexes. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784631
In a recent paper, Duersch et.al (2012) showed that in a rather broad class of repeated symmetric two-player games, a player who uses the simple "imitate-if-better" heuristic cannot be subject to a money pump. In this paper, we extend the analysis to games with randomly perturbed payoffs and we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110593
population. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games that will be further …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111755
equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences … translates into better analytic reasoning and a better ‘theory of mind’ …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259076
We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260559
We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage- game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage- game actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113383
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the seminal belief elicitation experiment by Nyarko and Schotter (2002) under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011947
This chapter analyzes the possibility of manipulation in futures markets, concentrating on the effects that manipulation may have on their informational efficiency . We use the concept of manipulation as it arises in the study of noncooperative games with imperfect information . The problem can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623471