We analyze a model where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing him with...

This volume contains the proceedings of a discussion forum relating issues of competitiveness in a globalised world to European competition policies. It includes a view from Joseph E. Stiglitz on competition in the New Economy, an EU view on new developments of Community policies, and a national...

We develop a model wherein collusive firms' decisions to keep or to destroy the hard evidence is endogenous. Unlike previous literature, we assume that the administration of the cartel crucially depends on the existence of the hard evidence. Within this framework, we explore the impact of a...

We analyze a situation where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing him with...

Tunisian manufacturing sector plays an important role in the Tunisian economy. It contributes significantly to the Gross Domestic Product, employment, gross fixed capital formation, merchandise exports, and the use of advanced technologies. Accordingly, it has been called upon to play a key role...

The collusion incentive constraint is an important economic measure of cartel stability. It weighs the profits of being in a cartel with those of cheating and punishment of the remaining cartel members. The constraint places no restrictions on firm cartel, cheating and punishment pricing, but is...

Abstract This paper is concerned with the neglected role of competition policy in East Asian development. Michael Porter considers Japan's development to have benefitted from intense competition among firms. By contrast, Caves and Uekusa criticize MITI's role in creating recession cartels and...

We develop a model wherein collusive firms' decisions to keep or to destroy the hard evidence is endogenous. Unlike previous literature, we assume that the administration of the cartel crucially depends on the existence of the hard evidence. Within this framework, we explore the impact of a...

Economic literature describes drastic and non-drastic innovations as sources of marginal cost reduction. The difference is that non-drastic innovations are unable to reduce the new marginal cost in order to ensure that the innovator is able to set monopoly price lower than the previous marginal...

I start from Nicola Giocoli’s acute rational reconstruction of current US antitrust debate which shows that there really is no shortage of plausible explanations to the Chicago persistent appeal puzzle. Each explanation, taken in isolation, is, at best, only partial. In my view, the persistent...