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An anti corruption mechansim
Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
suggests thaht corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal relationships between public officials and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259731
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Darke Side of Social Capital Social Preferences and Corruption
Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
suggests that corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal relationships between public officials and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027124
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An Incentive-Compatibility Approach to the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau
Claar, Victor V - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1997
An incentive-compatibility framework for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs is applied to the sponsor’s problem of monitoring a bureau. Following Mueller (1989), the bureau does not make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals to the sponsor. Rather, the bureau must announce a marginal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621692
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Bureaucracy, Underground Activities, and Fluctuations
Soldatos, Gerasimos T. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
This is a note on corruption and underground economy in a Kaldor-type model of the business cycle. It appears that when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114210
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Higher education corruption in Ukraine as reflected in the nation’s media
Osipian, Ararat - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
This paper considers corruption in higher education in Ukraine as reflected in the national media, including such … aspects as corruption in admissions to higher education institutions and corruption in administering the newly introduced … standardized test. The major focus is on the opinions of the leading figures of the education reform on corruption in education …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621986
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NCAA Athletic Departments: An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Revenue and Conference Changes
Pincin, Jared; Hoffer, Adam - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
The paper uses a panel of athletic department revenue and expenditure data of 227 public colleges and universities to empirically investigate the behavior of NCAA Division I athletic departments over the period 2006 – 2011. Four primary hypotheses were tested: (1) the effect of revenue changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260960
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Organization of Indian Health Bureaucracy and its Delivery System
K., Srinivasan; Raka, Sharan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
The aim of this paper is to probe into the structure and functioning of health bureaucracy in India with specific … reference to rural health bureaucracy of Tamil Nadu State. bureaucracy is defined as "a hierarchical division of staff who act … on formal assignments" - Gouldner(1954). This definition suggests five specific dimensions of bureaucracy namely (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260082
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ LENDING TO PAKISTAN
Anwar, Mumtaz - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
This paper analyzes the determinants of multilateral aid from international financial institutions (IFIs) to Pakistan, focusing on the world three major IFIs, the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB. Political economic factors, notably bureaucratic interests and major shareholders economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836381
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Meritocratic Aspects Concerning Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector - A Case Study for Romania
Matei, Ani; Matei, Lucica - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
performance for a public organisation, which represents by excellence a bureaucracy. Therefore, the evaluation of the "distance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533696
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Bureaucracy and Corruption Taxation Proof
Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of bribery between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027137