This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a …

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second … instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘conflict …

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …

contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated …

which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an …Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under … indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of …

contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each … component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and …