This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation with one incumbent and one entrant firm. It is shown that if firms can produce only one quality level welfare in this entry game can be lower than in monopoly. This is the case if qualities are strategic complements because the...

We model comparative advertising as brands pushing up own brand perception and pulling down the brand image of targeted rivals. We watched all TV advertisements for OTC analgesics 2001-2005 to construct matrices of rival targeting and estimate the structural model. These attack matrices identify...

This paper presents a model of collusion in vertically differentiated industries where firms have the option to make their products distinguishable to consumers by attaching a brand. We show that if consumers’ preferences are linear in the quality dimension and their beliefs satisfy a standard...

I evaluate the welfare effects of the 1997 merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in the medium-sized, wide-bodied aircraft industry. I develop an empirical model of multi-product firms, allowing for both learning-by-doing and product innovation in a dynamic game to quantify merger...

When there is significant overlap in potential partner airlines' route networks, policymakers have expressed concern that an alliance between such airlines may facilitate collusion on price and/or service levels in the partners' overlapping markets. The contribution of our paper is to put...

This paper analyses the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly under cross-ownership participation when players have heterogeneous, i.e. bounded rational and naïve, expectations. We find that when the shareholder that owns firm also holds a percentage of firm , the parametric stability region of the...

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the...

We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These...

In this paper we present an experiment in which we test the effects of sequential entry on the stability of collusion in oligopoly markets. Theoretical as well as experimental research suggests that a larger number of firms in an industry makes collusion harder to sustain. In this study, we...

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the...