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Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and cooperation
Kocher, Martin G.; Tan, Fangfang; Yu, Jing - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210882
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A Mountain Biker cannot start a journey in sixth gear: An Assessment of the U.N. Global Compact’s Use of Soft Law as a Global Governance Structure for Corporate Social Responsibili...
Ghafele, Roya; Mercer, Angus - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
The practical impossibility of employing hard law at an international level has meant that softer codes of conduct have stepped in to fill the void. The Global Compact is the most ambitious of these codes, created with a desire to engage business in the project of international development and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260197
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Delegation and Rewards
Vetter, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540487
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Competing risks analysis and deposit insurance governance convergence
Christopher, Gandrud - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
Why do policies often seem to converge across countries at the same time? This question has been studied extensively in the diffusion literature. However, past research has not examined complex choice environments, especially where there are many alternatives. My paper aims to fill this gap in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422000
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Delegation and Rewards
Vetter, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556731
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A model of delegated project choice
Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835706
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Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies
Choe, Chongwoo; In-Uck, Park - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
principal can benefit from such delegation relative to centralization. We show that beneficial delegation is possible when … complete contracts cannot be written, and delegation of authority should necessarily be to the information gatherer. The benets … of delegation stem from either efficiency gains or reduction in rent to the information gatherer. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543778
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The Allocation of Decision-Making Authority when Principal has Reputation Concerns
Tamada, Yasunari; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
in°uence her reputation through her delegation policy. With reputation concerns, we show that the principal tends to keep …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545990
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Strategic Vertical Separation
Sloev, Igor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
The paper explores incentives for strategic vertical separation of firms in a framework of a simple duopoly model. Each firm chooses either to be a retailer of its own good (vertical integration) or to sell its good through an independent exclusive retailer (vertical separation). In the latter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008497040
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Delegation and discretion
Armstrong, Mark - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1995
There are many situations in which a principal delegates decisions to a better-informed agent but does not choose to give full discretion. This paper discusses one reason why this might be desirable: the agent may have tastes that differ from those of the principal. Limiting the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109556