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The paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323925
This book shows the most recent topics in economic consumer theory. Also the book shows a review of econometric test of some topics in estimation of microeconometric models.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112522
Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to “microfoundations for macroeconomics”, the literature on free banking contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoner´s Dilemma model. While there can be no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011267869
In this paper we summarize the theoretical arguments of Carson and Groves, et al., and assemble early empirical evidence that comports with this theoretical framework. In doing so, we argue that redefining criterion validity in terms of consequentiality offers the potential for a fundamental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259693
We consider a second price auction between bidders with independently and identically distributed valuations, where a losing bidder suffers a negative direct externality. Considering ex-ante commitments to form bidding rings we study the question of core stability of the grand coalition, namely:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009211237
This paper analyzes the secret reservation price in eBay auctions. Under the assumptions of secret and public reservation price, the bidders choose the optimal bidding function and the seller selects equilibrium reservation price. This model argues that the choice of secret reservation price is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009372532
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556728
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. “Steeper†securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556730
[E. Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38] is a seminal paper in the field of mechanism design and implementation theory. [J. Moore and R. Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [B. Dutta and A. Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008595611
Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist (2009) asked whether there exists a two-person moving-knife procedure that yields an envy-free, undominated, and equitable allocation of a pie. We present two procedures: One yields an envy-free, almost undominated, and almost equitable allocation, whereas the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008595902